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Abstract 
In a best-shot public good, where the provision level is determined by the highest 
contribution instead of the sum of all contributions, there is potential for waste and 
underprovision due to coordination failure. These failures are exacerbated when agents 
are identical because there is no focal point to guide coordination. In most real-world 
best-shot public-good situations, however, heterogeneity exists in the ability to 
contribute and the benefits received from the good. With such differences, shared 
expectations might emerge to improve coordination and increase efficiency. Using 
laboratory experiments, we find significant behavioral responses to heterogeneity that 
improve efficiency, but not always from increased coordination. 
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1 Introduction 
When a public good is provided through a best-shot mechanism (Hirshleifer 1983; Bliss 
and Nalebuff 1984; Harrison and Hirshleifer 1989), the maximum individual contribution 
rather than the sum of all contributions determines the level of the good. This supply 
technology mimics many social problems, such as finding a cure for disease, calling an 
ambulance for a roadside accident, or providing a tsunami warning system, and is 
particularly relevant for regional, international, and global public goods (Holzinger 2001; 
Sandler 2006). Best-shot public goods sit at the intersection of two types of provision 
problems: free-riding and coordination failure. Free-riding arises because in most 
constructions each individual is better off if someone else provides the good and 
coordination failures occur because groups find it difficult to coordinate on one of the 
multiple equilibria—i.e., identifying which member contributes the optimal amount while 
all other members avoid duplicating the contribution. 
 
Beginning with Schelling’s (1960) seminal work, the literature generally accepts that 
shared expectations can yield focal points that distinguish one equilibrium from others 
(e.g., Mehta et al. 1994; Camerer 2003). Such expectations rely on the existence of 
heterogeneity in one or more dimensions.1 For best-shot public goods, two potential 
sources of heterogeneity are the ability to contribute (endowment) and the benefits 
received from the good (marginal private return). For example, the ability to contribute to 
the development of a cure for malaria varies by differences in resources, while the 
benefits of a cure vary by location-specific environmental attributes (e.g., malaria is 
concentrated in warm, wet regions). If one potential contributor has more resources 
than the others and therefore can achieve greater levels of provision, there may be a 
shared expectation that this agent will be the contributor. Alternatively, a potential 
contributor that stands to benefit the most from the public good might be expected to be 
the contributor for self-interested reasons—she has the most to lose from failed 
provision of the public good. The literature offers some indication that such hetero-
geneity can facilitate cooperation in the provision of best-shot public goods. Kroll et al. 
(2007) introduces endowment heterogeneity in a one-shot best-shot public good game, 
and though the focus of the study is not coordination, it reports that homogeneous 
treatments suffer from coordination failure while groups with heterogeneous 
endowments tend to coordinate on the optimal outcome. 
 
There is an extensive literature that examines coordination problems, including variants 
of the market-entry game, battle-of-the-sexes game and minimum-effort games, but little 
attention is directed to exploring coordination in the best-shot public good game. Yet the 
game offers a useful framework to investigate coordination and efficiency because 
coordination failures can occur from people contributing too much (multiple agents 
making duplicate contributions that are wasted) or contributing too little (the largest 
contributor giving less than the optimal amount). Indeed, a group can commit both 
missteps simultaneously. This closely resembles the volunteer’s dilemma, in which each 
person of a group faces a binary choice on whether to volunteer to provide a public 
good for her group (Diekmann 1985). Each subject is better off if the good is provided, 
but would be best off if someone else provided it. Experimental studies of the 
volunteer’s dilemma generally impose homogeneity in endowments and returns (e.g., 
Bilodeau et al. 2004; Goeree et al. 2005; Hörisch and Kirchkamp 2010), but a working 
paper by Healy and Pate (2012) introduces heterogeneity in the cost of provision. Their 
results indicate that cost heterogeneity improves coordination with group members 
more frequently selecting an equilibrium in which the low-cost member decides to 
volunteer while the others do not. 
 
Herein we examine the influence of within-group heterogeneity on the coordination and 
provision of a best-shot public good. We consider heterogeneous endowments and 
returns, separately and together, and find interesting differences between the two 
sources of heterogeneity. We find that heterogeneity in endowments is quite effective, 
having a large positive effect on coordination and efficiency. Results are mixed 
regarding heterogeneous returns—efficiency improves, but coordination does not. This 
divergent outcome arises because while heterogeneity in returns does not facilitate 
better coordination, it does change the nature of the coordination failures. 
 
 
2 Theoretical background 
Consider a group of n players with endowments  who make 
contributions of {c1, . . . , cn} to a best-shot public good. Each player receives a 
marginal private return {r1, . . . , rn} for each unit of the public good and the level of the 
good is equal to the largest individual contribution, max(c1, . . . , cn), so that the public-
good income, Cj , for group member j is Cj = rj × max(c1, . . . , cn). Total income is 
therefore Ij = Cj +ej −cj .We restrict our analysis to the most interesting case of rj > 1 for 
all j . 
 
First, a necessary condition for a Nash Equilbrium (NE) is that one player contributes 
her entire endowment and all other players contribute nothing. Intuitively, the nature of 
the best-shot good rules out multiple players contributing as an equilibrium, as any 
duplicated contributions are wasted leaving at least one player a profitable deviation to 
contribute nothing. Similarly, because the marginal private return from the public good 
exceeds one (rj > 1), it cannot be a Nash equilibrium (NE) for the single-contributor to 
contribute less than her full endowment, because there is a profitable deviation to 
increase contributions to the maximum. 
 
However, this condition is only sufficient for identical endowments. When endowments 
are heterogeneous, the contribution vector {e1, 0, . . . , 0} is a NE since nobody other 
than player j = 1, by construction the player with the highest endowment, can increase 
their payoff by contributing. Other NE may exist, but are dependent on marginal private 
returns. For any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, {0, . . . , 0, ej , 0, . . . , 0} is a NE if no player can increase his 
or her payoffs by unilaterally contributing their full endowment, which is true if the 
following holds: 
 
(1)     
 
If an agent with an identical or higher endowment contributes everything to the public 
good, then a person with a lower endowment always does best by not contributing 
anything. Thus, condition (1) is fulfilled for all i with ei ≤ ej and we can transform it into 
 
(2)     
 
If r1 > e1/(e1 −e2), it is a dominant strategy for the highest-endowment player to 
contribute everything, and thus everyone else contributes nothing. 
 
Thus the task of providing a best-shot public good takes the form of an anticoordination 
game (e.g., chicken game)—the group is best served by an asymmetric strategy, in 
which someone contributes their full endowment and nobody else contributes at all. 
With no heterogeneity in endowments or returns, game theory suggests chaos; there is 
nothing to guide coordination on a pure strategy, and mixed strategies do not facilitate 
efficient provision. Heterogeneity can potentially help coordination by eliminating Nash 
equilibria and by creating group members “marked” for contributions; heterogeneous 
endowments create group members who can clearly maximize group welfare and 
heterogeneous returns create group members who have the most to lose from failed 
provision. But a new mystery arises when there are both sources of heterogeneity and 
multiple players are “marked” at the same time. To sort out the relative strength of the 
sources of heterogeneity, we turn to a laboratory analysis. 
 
 
3 Experimental design 
3.1 Basics 
 
One hundred ninety-two undergraduate students were recruited from the student body 
at the University of Tennessee to participate in a computerized best-shot public good 
game. All subjects were unfamiliar with the best-shot mechanism, and written protocols 
ensured uniformity in procedures. All sessions were programmed and conducted using 
the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) with instructions displayed on-screen to 
subjects while a monitor read them aloud. Instructions concluded with a series of 
questions and answers and two practice periods to reinforce subject understanding. At 
the end of the experiment, subjects were called one at a time to be paid privately and in 
cash, with real earnings on average of approximately $20 for sessions lasting roughly 
forty-five minutes. 
 
3.2 Setting 
 
In each session, 16 subjects were randomly placed in groups of four and groups were 
reshuffled after each period (a “random stranger” design). Group members were not 
identified to one another, and communication between subjects was prohibited. A 
decision period began with subjects receiving an endowment of lab tokens which they 
simultaneously and anonymously allocated between a public account that provided a 
return on the highest individual contribution and a private account that provided a return 
of one per token invested. After all subjects made their decisions, they viewed their 
earnings from the private account, whether they were the largest contributor to the 
public account, the amount of the largest contribution to the public account, and the 
amount they earned from the public account. Each session had 20 rounds—each with 
new groups, endowments and values. 
 
3.3 Treatments 
 
The experiment followed a 2 × 2 design that varied homogeneity and heterogeneity  
conditions over endowments and marginal private returns. Therefore, we have the 
following four treatments: a baseline with homogeneous endowments and 
homogeneous returns  , heterogeneous endowments and homogeneous returns 
(eherho), homogeneous endowments and heterogeneous returns , and 
heterogeneous endowments and heterogeneous returns . In homogeneous 
endowment treatments, all members of the group received the same endowment in 
each period drawn randomly from the values of 10, 20, 30, or 40 tokens and were 
aware that each member of the group had the same endowment. In heterogeneous 
endowment treatments, each member had a different endowment randomly assigned 
from 10, 20, 30, or 40 with each value held by a member of the group. The same is true 
for returns with values of 1.25, 2, 3, and 3.75. We conducted 12 sessions, three 
sessions for each treatment, yielding 960 group and 3840 individual observations. 
 
3.4 Predictions 
 
The various combinations of homogeneous and heterogeneous endowments of 10, 20, 
30, 40 and marginal private returns of 1.25, 2, 3 and 3.75 yield the Nash equilibria 
shown in Table 1.4 With  (baseline), all Nash equilibria yield the same payoffs 
and there is nothing to guide players toward selecting a particular Nash equilibrium. 
Thus, in the homogeneous baseline treatment , we expect poor coordination and 
inefficiency from duplicate contributions and undercontribution. Introducing 
heterogeneity in returns , the Nash equilibria remain unchanged and all still yield 
identical payoffs. However, the presence of heterogeneity in returns opens the door for 
coordination, with the likely contributor being the group member with the most to lose if 
the good is not provided: the person with the highest return. Thus, in , we expect 
improved coordination and greater efficiency relative to the baseline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Nash equilibria in pure strategies 
 
 
When heterogeneity is only in endowments , a clearer story emerges. While 
multiple Nash equilibria still exist, they are no longer equally efficient. There is a Pareto-
optimal Nash equilibrium—the person with the highest endowment contributes the entire 
40 and the others contribute zero. We therefore expect  to provide a relatively 
strong focal point and facilitate increased coordination and greater efficiency relative to 
the baseline. 
 
In the case of heterogeneity in both endowments and returns , the situation 
becomes murkier. Heterogeneity exists in two dimensions and presents alternative 
potential focal points. A priori it is not entirely clear which, if any, focal point will facilitate 
coordination and these are experimental questions we test. However, the presence of 
heterogeneity provides the potential for coordination, so we anticipate some 
improvement in coordination and efficiency as compared to the homogeneous baseline, 
though we suspect the multiple potential focal points will frustrate coordination relative 
to the treatments with a single focal point. 
 
 
4 Results 
Higher contributions to a best-shot public good are not synonymous with higher 
efficiency, as in a summation public good, so we analyze contributions and efficiency 
separately. We first review individual contributions before moving to an examination of 
coordination and efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Mean individual contribution as a percentage of endowment by treatment, endowment and return 
 
 
4.1 Contributions 
 
Table 2 summarizes mean relative individual contributions defined as a percentage of 
endowment by treatment, endowment, and return. At the treatment level, the 
contribution levels are similar across the four treatments, ranging from 28 % to 38 %, 
rather close to the 25 % contribution rate in any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which 
one person contributes 100 % and the other three 0 %. Substantial variation in 
contributions arises, however, once the data is stratified by endowment and return. 
 
First, consider the mean individual relative contributions by endowment levels reported 
in columns 1 through 4 of Table 2. In the two treatments with homogeneous 
endowments, contribution levels are not statistically different across endowment levels.  
This is not the case when endowments are heterogeneous. In both treatments with 
heterogeneous endowments, the subjects with the high endowment contribute 
substantially more than the other three (combined).6 Note the subtle difference between 
the two heterogeneous endowment treatments. When returns are also heterogeneous, 
the contributions by subjects with an endowment of 40 are not as close to 100 % and 
the contributions of subjects with other endowments are not as close to 0. This may 
indicate that the influence of heterogeneous endowments as a focal point may be 
diminished by the presence of the additional heterogeneity in returns, a point to which 
we will return in the next subsection. 
 
Next, turn to the mean individual relative contributions by return levels reported in 
columns 5 through 8 of Table 2. As expected, we observe a general increase in 
contributions 
 
Fig. 1 Mean contribution levels as a percent of endowment by endowment and return for each treatment 
 
as the return from the public good increases, but the positive impact of returns on 
contributions is substantially greater when returns are heterogeneous within the group. 
This is particularly true when endowments are homogeneous (ehorhe); in this case, the 
subjects with the highest return (3.75) contribute nearly twice as much if the returns are 
heterogeneous than homogeneous (62 % versus 36 %). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of contributions in the four treatments. Figure 1a 
shows average relative individual contribution levels when endowments and returns are 
homogeneous (ehorho); as expected, no obvious pattern emerges since members of a 
group have no focal point to coordinate on. In Figs. 1b and 1c, however, when either 
returns or endowments are heterogeneous within a group while the other variable is 
homogeneous, the pattern reveals considerably more coordination—the group 
members with either the highest return in ehorhe (Fig. 1b) or the highest endowment in 
eherho (Fig. 1c) contribute more than the rest of the group. Figure 1d, where 
endowments and returns are heterogeneous (eherhe), indicates that subjects with the 
highest endowment still contribute more on average, but the size of relative 
contributions by these subjects is diminished, particularly when the return from 
contribution is small for the high-endowment group member. 
 
This visual inspection is confirmed by a conditional analysis of the data. Table 3 reports 
the results of a panel model that estimates the relative individual contributions as a 
function of the experimental treatments, the endowment levels, and the rates of return 
from the public good.7 Five models are estimated—a pooled model provides a 
between-treatment analysis to estimate treatment effects and general parameter 
effects, and four individual treatment models that provide a within-treatment analysis to 
estimate treatment-specific parameter effects. 
 
Estimates from the pooled model reveal that relative contributions in the  
treatment are significantly greater than the omitted baseline , while contributions in 
the  treatments are not. Subsequent analysis will show the relatively 
larger contributions in ehorhe are due to greater duplicative contributions. The three 
endowment levels and the three rates of return all have significant negative impacts on 
individual contributions compared to the omitted baselines of endowment 40 and return 
3.75. However, considering the social optimum in the best-shot public good depends on 
contributions from one member and no contributions from others, the treatment-specific 
models provide more insight on the interaction of the heterogeneity treatments and the 
contributions of specific group members. 
 
The estimates confirm the results from the aggregate numbers. First, estimates indicate 
that the level of endowments has a significant effect on relative contribution levels when 
endowments are heterogeneous, but not when they are homogeneous. More 
specifically, estimates reveal that the member with the highest endowment contributes 
substantially more than the other three members—69 to 80 percentage points more 
when returns are homogeneous (  model) and 42 to 65 points more when returns 
are heterogeneous (  model).  
 
Second, as with heterogeneous endowments, conditional estimates correspond to the 
initial findings that heterogeneity in the return of the public good significantly influences 
group coordination. In particular, estimates reveal that the member with the highest 
return of 3.75 (omitted) in  contributes substantially more than the other three 
members, though this result is muted when endowments are also heterogeneous  
 
Though the panel model estimates clearly show the treatment effects, it is worth 
pointing out the aggregation masks the extent that group members responded to the 
focal points. For instance, in the  treatment, group members with the highest or 
focal point return of 3.75 contributed all (none) of their endowment in 49 % (27 %) of the 
cases while those with a lower return contributed all (none) of their endowment 16 % 
(56 %) of the time. Subjects exhibited even stronger responses when endowments were 
heterogeneous ( ). The group member with the focal-point endowment of 40 
contributed all (none) of her endowment 77 % (6 %) of the time while those with smaller 
endowments contributed all (none) of their endowment in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Individual relative contribution panel models 7 % (82 %) of the cases. In the next section, we 
examine how such behavioral responses to focal points affect coordination and efficiency. 
 
 
4.2 Efficiency 
 
With a typical summation public good, the group benefit from contributions exceeds the 
individual benefit from not contributing, so contributions always improve social welfare. 
With a best-shot good, duplicative contributions are wasted and decrease social 
welfare. In fact, it is possible for a group to undercontribute and overcontribute at the 
same time by the largest contribution being less than the maximum possible and other 
members making duplicate, wasteful contributions. Further, under- and over  
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Group play by strategy and treatment  
 
 
contributions have different welfare consequences. Undercontributing is more costly to 
the group because it forgoes the potential return to all members while overcontributing 
only imposes a cost on the individual. Thus, in addition to coordination and efficiency 
levels, we investigate the underlying nature of the coordination failures across 
treatments. 
 
We place each group in one of four categories: Pareto-optimal if the group coordinated 
on the socially optimal Nash strategy, overcontribution if there were duplicate 
contributions, and undercontribution if the largest endowment was not fully contributed. 
All groups fall into one of these three categories, but we also include the category over 
and under to show the extent that a group exhibited both types of coordination failure 
simultaneously. Table 4 reports the frequency of group play in each category for the 
four treatments. 
 
Relative to the homogeneous baseline ( ), coordination is improved considerably 
when only endowments are heterogeneous ( )–42.9 % vs. 10.4 % (p = 0.000). This 
is not the case when only returns are heterogeneous ( )—12.1 % vs. 10.4 % (p = 
0.564). Therefore, heterogeneity in endowments facilitates significant increases in 
coordination, while heterogeneity in returns fails to deliver any real gains. The numbers 
reveal the source of this result. From Table 4, as well as Fig. 1, we see that the success 
of endowment heterogeneity occurs because it facilitates a more complete 
coordination—groups reduce undercontributions by recognizing that a contributor 
should give her entire endowment, but they also reduce overcontributions by identifying 
a single contributor. In the case of return heterogeneity, coordination is less complete—
groups lower undercontributions by recognizing that a contributor should give all, but 
they fail to identify a single contributor and therefore exhibit greater overcontributions. 
 
We now turn to how these coordination failures affect efficiency. For each treatment, 
Table 5 reports mean group efficiency as defined as the realized payoffs as 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Efficiency: percentage of potential payoffs realized and lost 
 
 
a percentage of possible payoffs. The numbers reveal that efficiency is greatest in 
 at 85.3 %, which is significantly greater than the 66.6 % observed in the baseline 
(p = 0.000), and the 80.3 % and 79.2 % observed in  (p = 0.036 and p 
= 0.015). Efficiency is statistically equivalent across  (p = 0.642), with 
each being significantly greater than the baseline (p = 0.000). Interestingly, though 
failed to facilitate greater coordination, it did lead to significantly greater efficiency. 
 
Table 5 also provides additional insights to the efficiency results by showing the extent 
that over- and undercontribution caused groups to not realize potential payoffs.  
Following previous results, the numbers show that the relatively high efficiency in 
occurs from reducing duplicative contributions (overcontributions) and increasing the 
level of the largest contribution (undercontributions). In the case of heterogeneous 
returns ( ), groups achieved greater efficiency only from increasing the largest 
contribution. Duplicative contributions actually lowered efficiency relative to the 
baseline. The numbers reveal that efficiency improves in  despite no significant 
improvement in coordination because the type of coordination failure changes—shifting 
from the more costly undercontribution to the less costly overcontribution. 
 
The results provide a compelling story about how heterogeneity affects individual 
contributions and group coordination in the best-shot public good setting. In the baseline 
treatment with homogeneous endowments and homogeneous returns, no coordination 
device stands out, and as expected, coordination on a Nash equilibrium fails sometimes 
nobody volunteers to contribute his or her endowment while sometimes too many do. 
When we introduce a focal point through heterogeneous endowments or heterogeneous 
returns to investment, or both, coordination improves and there are less cases of 
undercontributing. However, endowment heterogeneity is more effective at fostering 
coordination since it results in fewer cases of overcontributing as well. Subjects seem to 
accept more readily that the group member with the highest endowment is the provider 
of the public good than the subject with the highest marginal return. This can be seen in 
comparisons between contribution patterns in the two treatments with one source of 
heterogeneity as well as in the direct comparison in the treatment with both sources. 
 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper provides the first experimental investigation that combines a best-shot public 
good contribution game with both heterogeneity in endowments and heterogeneity in 
marginal returns from the public good. While this combination of asymmetry and 
heterogeneity is relevant for real-world situations, particularly for international and global 
public goods, researchers have paid little attention to the potential that such 
heterogeneity can overcome the coordination problem of a best-shot social dilemma. 
The study provides four general findings. First, despite the asymmetric nature of the 
best-shot provision technology, heterogeneity can help overcome coordination problems 
by providing focal points as a coordination tool. Second, not all focal points are equal. 
Group members coordinated their contributions more effectively with endowment 
heterogeneity than return heterogeneity. Third, heterogeneity from multiple sources can 
complicate coordination. Given endowment heterogeneity, the introduction of 
heterogeneity in returns reduced coordination and efficiency. Finally, not all coordination 
failures are the same. While return heterogeneity did not facilitate greater coordination, 
it did change the nature of failure and improved efficiency. 
 
These findings are important for the understanding of real-world problems, in which the 
person or country with the highest endowment is not always the one that gains the most 
from the public good. In the war against international terrorism, the country with the 
most resources to contribute might also be the country with the most to gain from 
success. Here the two focal points align, and thus, the country contributes. But in the 
case of finding a cure for malaria, the focal points do not align. The countries with the 
most to gain are not the ones with the most resources to contribute to malaria research. 
Coordination is more difficult and success might require additional mechanisms to 
facilitate progress. Thus, understanding how asymmetry and heterogeneity can impede 
and support coordination can improve decision making, including those related to 
bargaining processes and policy mechanisms. 
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